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Introduction 
In § 23 of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, “The Spatiality of Being-in-the-World,” 
Heidegger asks a marginal question. These marginal notes first appeared in the 1953 
publication of Being and Time and were occasioned by Heidegger’s re-reading of his 
1927 publication. In § 23 we find: 
 
 By de-distancing as a kind of being of Da Sein with regard to its being-in-
the-world, we do not understand anything like remoteness (nearness) or 
even being at a distance. We use the expression de-distancing in an active 
and transitive sense. It means a constitution of being of Da Sein of which 
de-distancing something, putting it away, is only a definite, factical mode. 
De-distancing means making distance disappear, bringing it near. Da Sein 
is essentially de-distancing. (Heidegger, 1996: 97) 
 
The marginal note appears after the words “De-distancing means making distance 
disappear,” and it is a curious question: “Where does the distance come from that 
is de-distanced?” I do not think, for example, that this question is resolved in 
Being and Time and, in part, its difficulty is complicit in Heidegger finding it 
necessary in his late essay, Time and Being, to retract § 73 of Being and Time 
where he attempts to derive primordial spatiality from temporality. But, what does 
it mean to make distance disappear, to de-distance, or to near, to bring near? It 
seems as if distance is given, and it is given for its taking. The essence of Da Sein, 
its Being, is de-distancing: “As the being that it is, it lets beings be encountered in 
nearness.” Nearing, de-distancing, is propriating. But our question, along with 
Heidegger, is: what gives distance such that it is nothing, it is non-appearance, is 
in truth what cannot appear as such? In the encounter of the appearance of beings, 
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in their nearing, distance is the encounter of non-appearance as such. In giving, it 
gives for. It gives, and in giving dissimulates itself. 
 
The New Humanities 
Is this an appropriate question, theme or enquiry for a humanities conference 
whose own theme is concerned with “new directions” along with a concern with 
“local and global dialogues in the Humanities”. That is to say, is this paper a 
somewhat esoteric excavation of a small philosophical matter concerning 
Heidegger studies, or might it locate itself in a more pressing way with the 
grounds of the question of the new, the local and the global in humanities? To 
what extent is there a fundamental address to distance and the distantiation of 
distance in any question of the “new” and in any encounter with a hermeneutics or 
understanding of the pairing of “global” and “local”? The Fourth International 
Conference on the Humanities poses it core theme or problematic precisely in 
terms of a concern with distance, with what it infers as disciplinary distances 
between techno-science and the humanities and between economy, commerce and 
the humanities, emphasizing somewhat genealogically, and via classical motifs a 
common ground or originary moment of the techne of making and of the oikos of 
economy embedded in an essential questioning of the human. The conference is 
orchestrated around dialogue that would address the “nature” of being human, the 
disciplines of the humanities, the imperatives of being humane, in relation to 
contemporary crises in the marginalization or distancing of the humanities from 
relations of power productive of our dominant forms of knowing and agency for 
action constitutive of techno-scientific and economic practices.  Again, we may 
ask, is a Heideggerian approach to the being of human being precisely as an 
ontological engagement with distance something pertinent to or even fundamental 
to the most pressing contemporary concern for “new directions” in the 
humanities. 
 
To continue with some orientating questions concerning the “directions” taken in 
this paper, it is not the first time we can encounter a conference on new directions 
in the humanities, or stage an event on how we might yet again ask what it is to be 
human, or probe how humanism might now be thought, or establish some 
analytics or bearings on the multiple confrontations to human rights as a daily 
local and global crisis. I want to briefly make reference to another conference on 
the humanities and on humanism, held in New York in 1968 and which 
occasioned the paper by the philosopher, Jacques Derrida, titled “The Ends of 
Man”, a paper that probed the reception of Heidegger in France, and the 
humanistic reading of Heidegger that held its ground, even in the face of 
objections by Heidegger himself (Derrida, 1982). Derrida engages with a double 
reading of “ends” as with whether it is possible or not to engage with a finality or 
telos for humanity, a finality inscribed in or founding enlightenment approaches 
to human rights, as will as the framing of a certainty that there is a proper to being 
human. That other reading would in some ways be more Heideggerian, in as much 
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as all of the naturalized precepts of humanism would be questioned, radically, 
such that we might here be witnessing the end of “man” as modernity might have 
thought it. This would coincide, for Heidegger, with an end to metaphysics, a 
closure to the securing ground subtended by Platonism in its many variations, that 
has defined western thinking to the present. And it would implicate the 




But are these concerns of Derrida’s for a conference on humanism held some 
thirty years ago relevant for us in the context of a conference on new directions in 
the humanities? I would suggest, firstly, that the “New Directions” conference 
does not make a break with metaphysics; moreover, it poses a range of concerns, 
political, pedagogical and hermeneutic that are crucial precisely to the degree that 
they are able to evade a question of metaphysics, or their relation to a radical 
engagement with the question of the proper to being human. In “The Ends of 
Man” Derrida poses what he terms as a series of “strategic bets” with respect to 
the very question of the “new” that Heideggerian ontology of Da Sein poses to 
humanism’s metaphysical legacy. In a sense he suggests there is something 
undecidable concerning these strategic orientations, that Heidegger at times 
followed one or another and that deconstruction is caught between them. One 
recourse is to recognise that metaphysics subtends the very ground or framework 
of the question, that its language and structure pose the limits to our questioning 
as such, that the metaphors of inside and outside themselves are foundational to 
metaphysics. Hence, one only has recourse to renovate metaphysics within its 
own housing, and there is no recourse to an outside. Opposed to this strategic bet, 
is an abandonment of humanism, a radical disjuncture or separation, an invocation 
to a wholly other understanding of the proper of being human. Derrida suggests 
that such a radical dislocation invariably necessitates a return to what it has left, if 
only to demarcate its distance, and thereby returns precisely to what it wanted to 
escape. Derrida locates Heidegger between these two bets, and a certain recourse 
that may engage deconstruction. He also invokes a third approach, that he names 
Nietzschean, and that he opposes to Heidegger, which concerns an active 
forgetting of Being, and an approach to the question of truth as a question of 
dissimulation and style, in short an engagement that will not differentiate between 
truth and appearance.  
 
This paper is fundamentally concerned with the antagonism I have just alluded to 
between Heidegger and Nietzsche, that we may initially open with Heidegger’s 
understanding of the proper of being human, Da Sein, as essentially de-distancing. 
This question of “distance” becomes for Derrida the key theme in his small book 
on Nietzsche, which I am suggesting is equally a pivotal engagement with 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on the question of truth and appearance. 
 3 
Everything hinges on a forgetting, active or not, intentional or overlooked, 
concerning the question of “woman.” 
 
Becoming Woman and the Distance of Truth 
Hence, these series of concerns over the question of distance were explored by 
Jacques Derrida in his short text, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, though he does not 
explicitly reference the marginal note in Being and Time. Rather, in a 
circumlocution he engages in an interlacing account of Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
commencing with an engagement with Nietzsche’s references to truth, woman 
and distance. For example, he quotes Nietzsche: 
 
But still! But still! My noble enthusiast, there is also in the most beautiful 
sailing ship so much noise and bustle and alas, so much petty, pitiable 
bustling! The enchantment and most powerful effect of woman is to use 
the language of philosophers, an effect at a distance, there belongs thereto, 
however, primarily and above all — distance! (Derrida, 1979: 47) 
 
Derrida emphasizes a doubling of distance crucial to Nietzsche. While woman 
seduces from a distance, one must also keep one’s distance. A distance from 
distance must be maintained. But this doubling is also a complex operation. It is 
not “woman” who is at a distance, but rather the “action in distans,” the effect at a 
distance, is “woman,” the “feminine operation.” She is not a determinable 
identity. One neither retreats from nor approaches “her.” Derrida suggests: 
 
Perhaps woman is not some thing which announces itself from a distance, 
at a distance from some other thing. In that case it would not be a matter of 
retreat and approach. Perhaps woman — a non-identity, a non-figure, a 
simulacrum — is distance’s very chasm, the out-distancing of distance, the 
interval’s cadence, distance itself, if we could still say such a thing. 
(Derrida, 1979: 49) 
 
As it never goes without saying, I am aware of the scandalous reception of 
Derrida’s text by particular feminist critics and philosophers and the polemics and 
side-taking that ensued around the betrayal of feminism by Derrida and 
deconstruction, as well as arguments that finally feminism might approach an 
ontology of its engagement with respect to sexual difference. The misogyny of 
Nietzsche is well engrained in feminist critical writings, and perhaps Derrida does 
not so much set out to “rescue” the Nietzschean corpus, via the planting of an 
oppositional truth to philosophy.  Rather, Derrida enables a Nietzschean style to 
dissimulate the truth to gender that would be the possibility itself for this or that 
position. And what is said here for “gender” would hold as well for humanism, 
and the “new” in directing the humanities. 
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At this point in his text, Derrida appeals to a certain Heideggerian language 
“Entfernung”: distance and the distantiation of distance, deferment of the distant, 
— Ent (annihilation) constituting the distance itself, “the veiled enigma of 
proximation.” (Derrida, 1979: 49-50) 
 
 
Platonism, Truth and Appearance 
The spur of Derrida’s text arrives late, at the moment he approaches Heidegger’s 
Nietzsche, which is also Heidegger’s two volumes of lectures titled Nietzsche 
(Heidegger, 1991). Over a four year period in the late 1930s Heidegger presented 
lecture courses on Nietzsche, now published in English in four “volumes.” In 
Spurs, Derrida cites explicitly § 24 of volume one: “Nietzsche’s Overturning of 
Platonism” in The Will to Power as Art (Heidegger, 1991: 200-210). § 24 
concerns Heidegger in a close reading of a short passage from Nietzsche’s 
Twilight of the Idols: “How the ‘True World’ at Last Became a Fable” (Nietzsche, 
1968: 40-41). I want to briefly give some account of the text and Heidegger’s 
orientation to it, before commencing on how Derrida mobilizes these texts in the 
context of truth, distance and woman. 
 
Subtitled “History of an Error,” “How the ‘True World’ at Last Became a Fable” 
provides in six brief stages or episodes a history of metaphysics or western 
philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, which is to say, from Plato to Platonism 
(which is not the same thing) to the overturning of Platonism in Nietzsche. It is 
also a history of distantiations, of distance’s structure and deconstruction. 
 
(i) The true world attainable: “I, Plato, am the truth.” The true world is the world 
of Ideas; the sensuous world is repudiated by the virtuous: “Oldest form if the 
Idea: relatively sensible, simple, convincing.” 
 
(ii) The true world is unattainable for the moment — promised to the wise, pious, 
virtuous: “Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more 
incomprehensible — it becomes woman, it becomes Christian …. Platonism. The 
supersensuous (Idea) breaks with the sensuous world of appearances. “Idea” is 
that which is beyond this world. Heidegger suggests here:  
 
The supersensuous is no longer present within the scope of human 
existence, present for it and its sensuous nature. Rather, the whole of 
human existence becomes this-worldly to the extent that the 
supersensuous is interpreted as the “beyond”. In that way the true world 
now becomes even truer, by being displaced even farther beyond and 
away from this world; it grows even stronger in being, the more it 
becomes what is promised and the more zealously it is embraced, that is, 
believed in, as what is promised.  (Heidegger, 1991: 205) 
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The “true world” at a distance and by that distance seduces us — we zealously 
embrace it for its promise, for what it says it gives and gives for. It is a phantom: 
the inauguration of Platonism in the becoming woman of the idea. 
 
(iii) “The true world, unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable but even as 
thought, a consolation, an obligation, an imperative”, what Nietzsche, in short 
hand, named Kantianism. 
 
(iv) “The true world — unattainable? In any case unattained, unknown: 
consequently not consolation, redemptive, obliging”: in short hand, positivism of 
the 19th century. 
 
(v) “True World”: an idea which is of use for nothing, a refuted idea. Let’s abolish 
it! A short hand for nihilism, the “true world” is in quotation marks. Heidegger 
comments:  
 
Platonism is overcome in as much as the supersensuous world, as the true 
world, is abolished; but by way of compensation the sensuous world 
remains, and positivism occupies it. … In spite of the fact that the 
supersensuous world as the true world has been cast aside, the vacant 
niche of the higher world remains, and so does the blueprint of an “above 
and below” which is to say, so does Platonism. The inquiry must go one 
step further. (Heidegger, 1991: 207) 
 
We can see with Heidegger’s comment a double problematic of distancing: the 
above and below, the niche of the idea and the niche of the world of appearances, 
truth and beauty, in the overturning of their distance, cannot simply be inverted; 
the very structuring hierarchy as such has to be affected. Distancing itself needs to 
disappear. But would this dis-appearance be in the name of truth, belonging, 
nearing of Da Sein to its proper being, the Being? Or would it be in the name of 
appearance, apparent truth, dissimulation of truth? 
 
(vi) “The true world is abolished: which world is left? The apparent one perhaps? 
But no! along with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one!” Is 
this for Nietzsche nihilism in the grand style? Abolition of the true and apparent 
worlds — being collapsing into nothing? Heidegger emphasizes the obverse: 
Nietzsche’s affirmation of the sensuous and the supersensuous, of appearance and 
truth, a twisting free of the hierarchy implicit in Platonism: “A new hierarchy and 
a new valuation mean that the ordering structure must be changed.” 
 
Giving and Giving For 
It is this section of Heidegger’s Nietzsche that Derrida engages with closely in 
Spurs. In particular, he emphasizes that Heidegger, in the thoroughness of his 
reading of Nietzsche’s “History of an Error,” fails to make the slightest reference 
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to Nietzsche’s “it becomes woman” in discussing the second stage, the 
inauguration of Platonism, or metaphysics. How does this elision of sexual 
difference from a history of metaphysics itself open a possible engagement with 
or reading of Heidegger? And how does Nietzsche’s allusion to “woman” open an 
engagement with thinking the question of “ordering structure” that would be other 
than metaphysics? To put this question more succinctly, how does Heidegger’s 
distancing from “woman” precisely become Derrida’s reading of de-distancing as 
Heideggerian annihilation, which, in turn, opens the possibility of thinking truth 
as appearance, truth as dissimulation, metaphor or style. It is perhaps significant 
that Heidegger is able to appeal directly to Nietzsche’s style only when discussing 
the sixth of his steps essentially concerned with truth as appearance:  
 
We sense directly from the animation of the style and manner of 
composition — how the clarity of this step conducts him for the first time 
into the brilliance of full daylight, where all shadows dwindle. (Heidegger, 
1991: 208) 
 
But then, what is the proper that Heidegger finds given in Nietzsche? The proper 
meaning of Being, the proper as such? What would be this other structure as 
Platonism’s overturning in the suspension of a structure of inversion? And how 
would that guarantee the proper, how would it be differentiated from, distanced 
from, a hierarchy of the true and apparent, the proper and improper? Is that 
distance abolished, or is that distance as distance unveiled, revealed as appearance 
as such? Derrida suggests towards the end of Spurs, under the title “Le Coup de 
Dons”, undecidedly the giving and taking, the gift and the poison of the gift, that 
“Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche has been idling offshore ever since it missed 
the woman in truth’s fabulous plotting” (Derrida, 1979: 109). If Nietzsche’s 
woman is dissimulating on the question of the gift, on “giving herself” and 
“giving herself for,” the “for” offers into the bargain an undecidability as to 
whether it is deception of appearance or whether it actually introduces some 
destination, finality or return. The thinking of structure in the overturning of 
Platonism’s hierarchy is precisely activated by the confounding here of the 
opposition of give and take, possess and possessed. Hence Derrida: “Should the 
opposition give and take, possess and possessed, be nothing more than a 
transcendental snare which is produced by the hymen’s graphic, it would then 
escape not only dialectics, but also any ontological decidability” (Derrida, 1979: 
111). 
 
Priority of Sexual Difference 
But, we can precisely encounter this “contamination” by the hymen’s graphic in 
the most difficult passages in Heidegger that emphasise a moment of ontological 
undecidability, for example, where Heidegger resorts to a shrill escalation of 
language defying translation, where property and propiation are that which is 
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proper to no-one and nothing, where the “it gives Being” and “it gives Time” is 
appropriation itself, neither within ontology or temporality. As Derrida says: 
 
Truth, unveiling, illumination are no longer decided in the appropriating of 
the truth of being, but are cast into its bottomless abyss as non-truth, 
veiling and dissimulation. The history of Being becomes a history in 
which no being, nothing, happens except appropriation’s (Ereignis’) 
unfathomable process … what Nietzsche is calling the style’s form and the 
no-where of woman. (Derrida, 1979: 119-121) 
 
 
If Heidegger fails to mention Nietzsche’s woman, his own twisting out of 
Platonism will not escape the actio in distans that is Nietzsche’s “feminine 
operation.” If, for Nietzsche, woman’s gift is the undecidable play of give and 
give for, give and take, let take and appropriate, these will become for Hiedegger 
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